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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judge 
 The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
(“FACTA”) provides, in relevant part, that merchants who 
accept credit or debit cards shall not print “the expiration 
date” of the cards upon any receipt provided to the cardholder 
at the point of the sale.  The question in this case is whether a 
retailer willfully violates that statute by printing the expiration 
month, but not the year, of the credit card on a receipt.  The 
District Court answered that question in the negative, and 
dismissed appellant Randy Long’s complaint against Tommy 
Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc.  We will affirm.       
 
I. 
On October 29, 2009, Long made a purchase of “men’s 
neckwear” using his credit card at a Hilfiger store in Grove 
City, Pennsylvania.  His credit card was charged $24.99, and 
Hilfiger gave him an electronically-printed receipt that 
redacted all but the last four digits of his credit card number 
and displayed the month, but not the year, of his card’s 
expiration date.  In pertinent part, the receipt read as follows: 
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SALESPERSON  #  8399 
 
881300009340 MENS NECKWEAR 24.99 
 
TOTAL      $24.99 
VISA       $24.99 
############9802 
PURCHASE 
EXPIRY:  04/##  SWIPED   
 
(JA 46.)   
On December 29, 2009, Long filed this action against 
Hilfiger alleging that Hilfiger’s printing of “EXPIRY: 04/##” 
on his receipt willfully violated FACTA’s prohibition against 
printing the expiration date.  Long sued on his own behalf and 
asserted a putative nationwide class action on behalf of all 
others similarly situated.  He sought statutory damages for the 
alleged violation, as well as punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, 
and costs.   
 
Hilfiger moved to dismiss Long’s complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).  With the 
consent of the parties, the District Court denied the motion 
without prejudice and referred the case to mediation.  
Mediation was unsuccessful, and Hilfiger renewed the motion 
to dismiss.  On February 11, 2011, the District Court granted 
the motion, concluding that (1) printing the month of 
expiration, standing alone, did not constitute the printing of an 
“expiration date” under the statute, and (2) in any event, Long 
could not recover because the alleged violation was not 
“willful.”  Long appealed. 
 
 II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
exercise plenary review over both the grant of a motion to 
dismiss, Fagin v. Gilmartin, 432 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 
2005), and questions of statutory interpretation, DIRECTV 
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Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2007).   
A. 
In 2003, Congress amended the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by enacting FACTA.  See Pub. 
L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).  As part of an effort to 
prevent identity theft, FACTA prohibits merchants from 
printing certain credit and debit card information on receipts.  
In particular, it provides: 
 
(g) Truncation of credit card and debit card 
numbers 
. . . .  
 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards 
for the transaction of business shall print more 
than the last 5 digits of the card number or the 
expiration date upon any receipt provided to the 
cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1).1
FACTA imposes civil liability for violations of this 
provision, with the available remedies dependent upon 
whether the violation was negligent or willful.  If a 
merchant’s violation was merely negligent, a plaintiff may 
recover only actual damages, and statutory damages are not 
available.  Id. at § 1681o(a)(1).  If the violation was willful, 
however, FACTA allows a plaintiff to elect to recover either 
actual damages or statutory damages between $100 and 
$1,000.  Id. at § 1681n(a)(1)(A).  A court may also award 
punitive damages in cases involving willful violations.  Id. at 
§ 1681n(a)(2).  
   
 
                                                 
1 FACTA expressly limits the reach of this subsection “to 
receipts that are electronically printed, and [does] not apply to 
transactions in which the sole means of recording a credit card 
or debit card account number is by handwriting or by an 
imprint or copy of the card.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(2). 
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In 2008, almost five years after the passage of FACTA, 
Congress enacted the “Credit and Debit Card Receipt 
Clarification Act” (“Clarification Act”).  See Pub. L. No. 110-
241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).  The Clarification Act arose from 
“hundreds of lawsuits” that were filed against merchants after 
the effective date of FACTA, alleging that merchants’ “failure 
to remove the expiration date was a willful violation” of the 
statute, even though the account number was properly 
truncated.  Clarification Act § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. at 1565.  
Congress found that many merchants mistakenly believed that 
§ 1681c(g) would be satisfied solely by truncating the card 
number and not the expiration date.  Id. at § 2(a)(3), 122 Stat. 
at 1565.  It noted that none of the lawsuits that had been filed 
alleged any actual harm to the consumer’s identity, and 
“[e]xperts in the field agree that proper truncation of the card 
number . . . regardless of the inclusion of the expiration date, 
prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrating identity theft 
or credit card fraud.”  Id. at § 2(a)(5)-(6), 122 Stat. at 1565.  It 
deemed these lawsuits to be a significant burden on 
businesses, without any corresponding consumer benefit.  Id. 
at § 2(a)(7), 122 Stat. at 1565-66.  Therefore, Congress 
amended FACTA to state that any merchant who printed an 
expiration date, but otherwise complied with FACTA, 
between the dates of December 4, 2004 and June 3, 2008, 
shall not be deemed in willful noncompliance with § 
1681c(g).  Id. at § 3(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d)), 
122 Stat. at 1566. 
 
B. 
 This appeal raises two related questions.  The first is 
whether Long’s allegation that Hilfiger printed his credit 
card’s expiration month, but not the year, states a claim under 
FACTA.  If so, the second question is whether such a 
violation of the statute meets the standard for “willfulness.”  
These are issues of first impression among the federal courts 
of appeals.  We will address each in turn.  
 
1. 
Determining whether Long has stated a claim under 
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FACTA requires us to interpret the statute.  The principles 
governing statutory interpretation are well-known.  Our role is 
to give effect to Congress’s intent, which we assume is 
expressed in the ordinary meaning of the statutory language.  
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 
199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008).  In analyzing whether the statutory 
language is unambiguous, “we take account of ‘the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.’”  Id. (quoting In re Price, 
370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004).  We also consider the 
“overall object and policy of the statute, and avoid 
constructions that produce odd or absurd results or that are 
inconsistent with common sense.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In addition to following these 
general rules of statutory interpretation, we are mindful that 
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate 
its purpose.  Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 
F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
 The critical inquiry before us is the meaning of 
FACTA’s requirement that no person shall print “the 
expiration date.”  The phrase “expiration date” is not defined 
in the statute.  Hilfiger argues, however, that the phrase refers 
to an ascertainable date on which the credit or debit card 
ceases to be valid, and requires the simultaneous coexistence 
of both the month and the year.  Hilfiger concludes, therefore, 
that merely printing “April” or “04” does not constitute 
printing an “expiration date” within the meaning of § 
1681c(g)(1).   
 
We disagree.  Taking Hilfiger’s argument to its logical 
conclusion, a merchant would not violate FACTA so long as 
it redacted even a single number from either the month or year 
of the card’s expiration date.  Furthermore, different 
merchants could each choose to redact different portions of 
the expiration date, making it possible to ascertain the entire 
expiration date from multiple receipts.  This, of course, would 
be inconsistent with the statute’s objective of preventing 
identity theft and a result certainly not intended by Congress. 
 
We conclude that the most natural reading of the 
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phrase “expiration date” is that it refers to the information or 
data (usually a string of numbers) contained in the expiration 
date “field” on the face of the credit or debit card.  In other 
words, FACTA is best read as prohibiting merchants from 
printing the numbers in that field, which Long alleges Hilfiger 
did in this case by printing “EXPIRY: 04/##.”  The fact that 
Hilfiger printed only a part or portion of the expiration date 
numbers from Long’s credit card does not change the result.  
To be sure, FACTA is silent as to the effect of a partial 
printing of the expiration date.  Nevertheless, if Congress had 
intended to allow a partial printing, it would have used 
language similar to what it used for credit or debit card 
numbers.  With respect to card numbers, Congress clearly 
indicated the scope of disclosure allowed by specifically 
stating that no merchant shall print “more than the last 5 
digits of the card number.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) 
(emphasis supplied).  Congress demonstrated that it knew 
how to use language allowing for the partial disclosure of 
information, but elected not to include any such language in 
the context of expiration dates.  Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that FACTA provides an exception for merchants 
who redact part of the expiration date information on the 
receipt.               
 
 Hilfiger’s reliance on the Clarification Act is 
unpersuasive.  Despite having the occasion to specifically 
consider the issue of expiration dates, Congress did not 
change the actual language of § 1681c(g)(1) or otherwise alter 
the liability standard of the statute.  Just as before, the 
statutory language stated that “no person . . . shall print . . . 
the expiration date” on a receipt.  What Congress did do was 
to provide a safe harbor for merchants who had been sued for 
printing such dates.  We will not assume that Congress 
intended a greater limitation of liability than what is explicitly 
stated in the statutory text.           
 
For these reasons, and consistent with our duty to 
interpret remedial statutes broadly, Idahoan, 157 F.3d at 202, 
we hold that § 1681c(g)(1) prohibits a merchant from printing 
expiration date information on a receipt provided to the 
consumer, even if the year is redacted.  Therefore, Long 
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properly alleged that Hilfiger violated FACTA.    
2. 
 Having determined that Long properly alleged a 
violation of FACTA, we next ask whether FACTA authorizes 
him to recover for the violation.  Long concedes that he did 
not suffer any actual damages, and instead requests statutory 
damages together with punitive damages and attorneys’ fees 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).  As noted above, however, Long 
is not eligible for such relief unless he can allege, and 
ultimately prove, that the violation of the statute was 
“willful.”  Id.   
 
 The Supreme Court addressed the willfulness 
requirement of § 1681n(a) in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 
551 U.S. 47 (2007).  In Safeco, the Court considered a 
provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act which requires 
notice to a consumer subjected to “adverse action . . . that is 
based in whole or in part on any information contained in a 
consumer [credit] report.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a).  With 
respect to an insurance company, an “adverse action” is 
defined in part as “an increase in any charge for, or a 
reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms 
of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied 
for.”  Id. at § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).  The defendant insurance 
companies in Safeco argued that they did not violate the 
statute by failing to give notice, because the plaintiffs’ claims 
were based on “initial rates charged for new insurance 
policies.”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 60-61.  The defendants argued 
that the initial rate for a new policy “cannot be an ‘increase’ 
because there is no prior dealing” between the parties.  Id.  at 
61.  In other words, the defendants argued that the statutory 
reference to “increase in any charge” was meant to cover 
“change[s] in treatment for an insured, which assumes a 
previous charge for comparison.”  Id.   
 
 The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ 
interpretation, concluding that applying the statute to initial 
rates for new policies is a “better fit with the ambitious 
objective set out in the Act’s statement of purpose.”  Id. at 62.  
Although finding a violation of the statute, however, the 
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Court concluded that the violation was not willful because the 
willfulness component is not met “unless the action is not 
only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s 
terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the 
law substantially greater than the risk associated with a 
reading that was merely careless.”  Id. at 69 (emphasis 
supplied).  Accordingly, the Court held that a violation does 
not cross the willfulness threshold just because a defendant’s 
interpretation is erroneous; it must instead be “objectively 
unreasonable.”  Id.   
 
The “objectively unreasonable” standard was not met 
in Safeco for several reasons.  First, the statute itself was 
“silent on the point from which to measure ‘increase’” and the 
Supreme Court considered the statutory text “less-than-
pellucid.”  Id. at 69-70.  Second, the defendant’s proposed 
interpretation had a “foundation in the statutory text . . . and a 
sufficiently convincing justification to have persuaded the 
District Court to adopt it.”  Id.  Finally, the Court noted that 
“[b]efore these cases, no court of appeals had spoken on the 
issue, and no authoritative guidance has yet come from the 
FTC.”  Id. at 70.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the 
defendant’s reading was not objectively unreasonable, and fell 
“well short” of meeting the willfulness standard.  Id.; see also 
Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 803-04 
(7th Cir. 2010) (applying Safeco to conclude it was 
objectively reasonable for merchant to believe § 1681c(g) did 
not apply to e-mailed receipts).  
 
 In light of Safeco, we conclude that Hilfiger’s 
interpretation of the statute is not “objectively unreasonable” 
and, thus, that Long has not stated a claim for a willful 
violation of FACTA.  Just as in Safeco, Hilfiger’s 
interpretation of § 1681c(g)(1) has some foundation in the 
text, as Hilfiger could believe that the statute did not apply 
based on what it considered to be the plain meaning of the 
phrase “expiration date.”  That phrase is not defined in the 
statute itself, just as the statute in Safeco was silent as to the 
point from which to measure an increase in a charge for 
insurance.  Furthermore, despite the fact that we reject 
Hilfiger’s interpretation of the § 1681c(g)(1) language, it was 
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at least sufficiently persuasive to convince the District Court 
to adopt it.  Although Long argues that there was district court 
authority putting Hilfiger on notice that its interpretation was 
incorrect,2 there was no guidance from the federal courts of 
appeal on this issue.3
 
    
 Long’s additional arguments on this point are 
unpersuasive.  He contends that it is possible that Hilfiger 
“did not actually rely on any interpretation” of § 1681c(g)(1), 
and instead “disregarded the statute altogether and is only 
now seizing upon a post hoc ‘objectively reasonable’ 
interpretation in order to shield itself from liability.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 25.  This argument, however, is expressly 
foreclosed by Safeco, which held that evidence of subjective 
bad faith or intent of the defendant is irrelevant when there is 
                                                 
2 Long cites, for example, Follman v. Hospitality Plus of 
Carpentersville, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 960, 964 (N.D. Ill. 
2007); Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 786 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007); Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, 
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2007); and Ramirez 
v. Midwest Airlines, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1171 (D. 
Kan. 2008).  These decisions are not directly on-point because 
they involve merchants who, unlike here, printed the entire 
expiration date.   
3 Long argues there was agency guidance on this issue, citing 
to a brief FTC “Business Alert” indicating that merchants 
“must delete the card’s expiration date[, f]or example . . . 
EXP: ****.”  Slip Showing? Federal Law Requires All 
Businesses to Truncate Credit Card Information on Receipts 
(May 2007).  We are doubtful that this Business Alert 
constitutes the kind of “authoritative guidance” from the 
agency envisioned by the Supreme Court.  See Safeco, 551 
U.S. at 70 n.19 (rejecting the FTC document relied upon by 
plaintiffs because it was a letter written by an FTC staff 
member that “did not canvas the issue” in question and was 
merely an informal opinion not binding on the Commission).  
In any case, we cannot conclude from this Business Alert 
standing alone that Hilfiger ran a risk of violating FACTA 
substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading 
that was merely careless.   
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an objectively reasonable interpretation of the statute that 
would allow the conduct in question.  See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 
70 n.20.  Thus, Long’s allegation about Hilfiger’s actual 
knowledge or intent as to FACTA’s requirements is 
immaterial to the objective reasonableness analysis.  For these 
same reasons, we are also unpersuaded by Long’s argument 
that he requires discovery to establish Hilfiger’s subjective 
knowledge.  See Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 803-04 (affirming 
a 12(b)(6) dismissal of a FACTA complaint in part on the 
ground that the defendant’s proffered interpretation was 
objectively reasonable); Safeco, 551 U.S. at 71 (concluding 
defendant’s interpretation was objectively reasonable and 
finding “no need . . . to remand the cases for factual 
development”). 
 
 In sum, we conclude that Hilfiger’s interpretation of § 
1681c(g)(1), although erroneous, was at least objectively 
reasonable.  Hilfiger did not run “a risk of violating the law 
substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading 
that was merely careless.”  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69.  
Accordingly, Long has not stated a claim for a willful 
violation of FACTA, and the District Court did not err in 
dismissing his complaint.  
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.   
 
 
 
 
